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To whom much is given, much is expected.  While this biblical verse may not have been 
referring to corporate executives, it is certainly applicable to their situation.  As the average market 
capitalization of American public companies continues to the rise, so too does the compensation 
package for these companies’ Chief Executive Offi  cers.  Chief Executives at the highest level of the 
corporate ladder are richly rewarded for their responsibility; from 2000-2003 the average CEO was 
paid $8.5 million annually.1  While the everyday worker may be appalled at such an exorbitant fi gure, 
this paper will argue that there is nothing inherently immoral about the fact that compensation levels 
are so high.  Th e rising pay level for CEOs is justifi ed by recent increases in overall national wealth and 
productivity, increases in competition for top-tier talent, and increases in overall job risk associated 
with the position.  Th e nature of the self-correcting American market is such that CEOs earn their 
salary in a legal and moral fashion.  Th e discrepancy between CEO pay and average pay is not only 
justifi ed, but necessary to sustain current conditions of the American economy.
Milton Friedman argues the only responsibility of a business is to increase the value of the 
fi rm in order to increase shareholder profi ts.2  To achieve this end, the interests of the CEO and the 
shareholder should be as closely aligned as possible.  Th is way, the CEO’s main priority is to increase 
his fi rm’s share price.  High pay that is tied to company performance is the simplest way to accomplish 
this goal.  If the recent dramatic increases in compensation were simply increases in base pay, criticism 
might be well-founded.  However, executive pay includes several additional types of compensation 
including annual bonuses tied to performance measures, stock grants, and stock options.  In the early 
1990s, stock options on average accounted for only 20% of a CEO’s compensation package.  In 2000, 
they accounted for 50%.3  Prior to these changes, CEOs would take home the same large paycheck 
regardless of company performance.  With more diverse compensation, they now have greater 
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incentives to meet and exceed performance goals.  If the stock price of the company falls below the 
contracted exercise price, this portion of the compensation package is rendered worthless.  Th erefore, 
the changes in compensation structure associated with increasing pay levels will help further the 
interests of the stockholders.  Th is is one moral justifi cation for why CEOs get paid so much more 
today than they did in previous years.   
While the shareholder theory outlined above clearly justifi es the shift  to more diverse payment 
schemes for CEOs, it does not necessarily justify the absolute high level of pay.  It is not indisputably 
clear that an increase in total compensation was necessary to convince CEOs to accept the shift  in 
payment styles.  Perhaps an alternative arrangement could have been made in which CEOs would 
accept stock options in exchange for, not in addition to, some of their current pay.  Th is way, the 
interests of the executives and the shareholders would still be aligned, and shareholder earnings would 
not have to be reduced to cover the higher salary.  CEOs would likely resist this off er, though, as 
options or stock grants add a greater amount of risk to their compensation “portfolio.” Still, it is 
uncertain if CEOs would actually leave their jobs or consciously lower their job performance if the 
board of directors forced them to accept such a change. 
Due to the uncertainty outlined above, one way to ensure consistency with Friedman’s 
shareholder theory that company value is increased is to perform a cost-benefi t analysis on a CEO’s 
salary.  Scholar Jeff rey Moriarty argues that if adding shareholder value is the inherent obligation of 
the fi rm, then the CEO should increase fi rm value in excess of his salary.4  Th erefore, in order to 
justify his salary, any marginal increase in the total market value of a company should outweigh the 
total marginal increase in a CEO’s pay.  While it is diffi  cult to determine exactly how much value one 
individual can add to a company, the overall market capitalization of a company provides a telling 
indication of performance.  From 1980 to 2003, there has been a six-fold increase in CEO pay along 
with a six-fold increase in weighted market capitalization.5  Moriarty is quick to point out the rising 
trends in compensation in his “dessert” argument that CEOs do not earn their pay; however, he 
fails to mention this parallel rising trend in results.6 Year-to-year increases in CEO pay are extremely 
consistent with shareholder gains.7 Th e CEO is certainly not the only employee who contributes to 
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exceptional performance.  It is diffi  cult to prove that the parallels between pay and results are causal 
in nature rather than merely correlated.  However, the fact that higher costs are correlated with higher 
benefi ts makes CEO compensation appear to be morally acceptable since both CEOs and shareholders 
are better off . 
In addition to the stakeholder theory argument, a utilitarian argument also supports CEO 
compensation.  Higher compensation levels are justifi ed to the extent that total social utility is 
maximized for anyone who either aff ects or is aff ected by the fi rm’s actions.  In order to support 
executive salaries, paying a CEO a higher salary would have to create an overall net increase in utility 
for the CEO, the employees, the customers, the shareholders, and others whose utility is at stake.  As 
previously discussed, shareholders have benefi ted through rising stock prices.  Higher stock prices also 
have the potential to benefi t customers.  Th ey indicate that fi rms have greater access to capital, enabling 
them to invest in effi  ciency improvements and achieve economies of scale.  As a result, consumer 
prices will likely decrease.  Lower pries will stimulate demand, leading to benefi ts for distributors or 
manufacturers connected to the fi rm’s product.  Only the fi rm’s employees do not necessarily benefi t 
as the increase in company profi t may not necessarily be used to increase their salaries.  
In addition to his shareholder theory, Friedman’s unrelenting support for open markets supports 
current levels of executive compensation.  In an open market, there is only one legitimate way to value 
any service or commodity; it is “worth” whatever people are willing to pay for it.  As long as there is no 
coercion involved, the free market puts a price tag on every commodity.  While some may argue that 
a Lexus is not “worth” so much more than a Chevrolet, manufacturers should not be reprimanded for 
charging whatever the market will bear.  Neither should CEOs.  So long as legal regulations require 
full disclosure of corporate compensation, the shareholders will be able to freely evaluate whether 
the fi rm still provides value.  If shareholders perceive that high CEO pay is compromising company 
profi ts, they will choose to either sell the stock or refrain from purchasing stock in the fi rst place.  Th is 
provides a check on CEO pay and ensures that they are leading their fi rms in a manner that makes 
everyone better off . 
In addition to the participation of stockholders, the oversight of board members also justifi es the 
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elevated level of CEO compensation.  Although some argue that CEO compensation is intentionally 
infl ated by members of the board in order to increase their own future salary, it is unfair to presume 
that board members will act on self-interest alone.  While evidence suggests that higher-paid board 
members grant their CEOs larger compensation packages, the high salaries of all participants may 
just stem from the fact that a company is larger, more profi table, or more risky.  Confl icts of interest 
exist in many career fi elds.  A car mechanic, if acting in his best interest, would always claim that a car 
needed a new engine or other expensive parts.  However, just as a car mechanic would not want to put 
his reputation or the reputation of his industry at risk, neither would the board member. 
Th e increasing presence of private equity fi rms further negates any claims that special 
relationships between the CEO and his board of directors are the main driver behind the infl ation of 
CEO pay.  Critics of high CEO pay argue that executive salaries are invalid because they are skewed by 
negotiations that are not at arm’s length.  Private equity transactions such as CEO salary agreements, 
however, are always at arm’s length.  Private equity operates on the idea that impartial bankers will 
cut out ineffi  ciencies to add value.  Employees are oft en fi red and paychecks are oft en slashed.  When 
private equity fi rms buy a company and “take it private”, they will not hesitate to cut compensation for 
a CEO if she is not performing at a level judged to be commensurate with his or her salary.  Th erefore, 
a comparison of salaries in public and private fi rms would be telling.  Sageworks, a stock research 
fi rm, compared the salaries of CEOs in ten public fi rms and their counterparts in ten private fi rms of 
the same size and industry.8 Th ere is indeed a discrepancy in CEO pay at private fi rms versus public 
fi rms, with salaries averaging at $3.3 million for the former and $7.7 million for the latter.9 However, 
the diff erence in salary may be attributed to inherent diff erences in the nature of the job.  CEOs of 
public companies must take on greater public scrutiny as well as greater legal liability, especially aft er 
the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Also, CEOs of privately held companies get a more of their 
compensation in cash, while CEOs of public companies are compensated with more stock options 
or other performance-based alternatives.  Th is is more risky, which entitles CEOs to demand greater 
overall pay in order to take on this risk. 
A dramatic rise in the number of private equity fi rms also presents another justifi cation for high 
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compensation for CEOs: the competition for talent.  CEOs are uniquely able to maneuver across 
industries.  A doctor trained in neurosurgery could not suddenly decide to switch to ophthalmology just 
because a higher demand off ered an increase in salary.  However, a CEO trained in managing fi nancial 
operations for a company specializing in one industry would have a much easier time transferring 
his skills to a vastly diff erent industry.  Th is is demonstrated by the relentless pursuit of CEOs by 
headhunters representing private equity fi rms.  In 1987, private equity fi rms managed a cumulative 
total of $1 billion in assets.  Today, over 2700 fi rms manage $500 billion in assets.10  In recent years, 
CEOs from major companies such as General Electric and IBM have left  their fi rms to pursue careers 
in private equity.  Th us, in order to retain superior talent higher salaries must overshadow the allure 
of the private sector.
Arguments comparing the risk levels and downfalls of being employed as a public versus a private 
CEO can also be applied to being employed as a public CEO versus an everyday employee.  CEOs are 
the face of the company and are held responsible for any major event gone wrong.  Th ey are subject 
to public scrutiny and greater liability.  CEOs are oft en held accountable for diffi  cult situations over 
which they had no control.  For example, in 2007 Citigroup experienced losses from mortgage-backed 
securities.  Even though many banks were in similar positions and CEO Charles Prince alone did not 
cause the subprime crisis, he was criticized for his performance and ultimately left  the company.  As 
mentioned before, however, CEOs do have greater job mobility than those in other fi elds.  Nonetheless, 
even marketability of managerial skills oft en does not off set the hassle of seeking out a new position.   
CEOs work longer hours on average, which necessitates higher pay to compensate for this sacrifi ce. 
Accepted economic models support the idea that as individuals move higher up the corporate ladder, 
they must be paid exponentially more if they are expected to increase the quantity and quality of labor 
that they produce.  Current economic theory provides a model detailing the tradeoff s between labor 
and leisure.  In this model, there are two battling eff ects.  Th e substitution eff ect suggests that as a CEO’s 
average wage rises, she will want to work more hours because the opportunity cost of leisure will be 
higher.  However, the opposing income eff ect suggests that as a CEO becomes wealthier, marginal utility 
of money decreases.  She will then be more likely to choose leisure over labor.  Only a much higher salary 
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would prevent one from making this choice.
Jeff rey Moriarty’s “utility view” argues that if CEO salaries were lowered across-the-board, fears of a 
massive exodus of CEOs would be unfounded.  CEOs would have no better alternatives given the concurrent 
elimination of alternatives.  Although the talent pool may not be aff ected in the short term, there could 
be greater long term implications.  High salaries of top businessmen may be necessary to encourage the 
fi nest students to enter the fi eld.  Th e earnings potential of jobs in is arguably one of the industry’s strongest 
appeals.  Among elementary school students, the answer to the question “what do you want to be when you 
grow up?” is usually not “a CEO”.  Managing arguably does not provide the same sense of contributing to 
the world or opportunities for personal expression as do professions in the medical fi eld or the arts.  As such, 
a high salary is one way to recruit top talent to a fi eld where it takes many years to reach a position of power. 
Th e “tournament theory” suggests that by making lucrative salaries the prize for making it to the top, more 
competitors will enter the race. 
Still, there are many others who have unpleasant jobs but commit to them in spite of lower salaries. 
Although the discrepancies in pay may therefore seem “unfair”, this argument seems to center on gut reactions 
rather than thorough analysis.  Th e initial shock at hearing that CEOs were paid 430 times the amount of 
the average American’s salary in 2004 may be diffi  cult to overcome.  However, the math behind this statistic 
is highly questionable.  A handful of high-paid outliers distort the data, making the median a more reliable 
fi gure.  Th e median take-home pay for CEOs in 2004 was 187 times that of the median worker.11  Another 
important clarifi cation is the nature of the sample used to collect data.  Th e fi gures mentioned are based on 
a survey of CEOs of S&P 500 companies, some of the largest and most successful companies in the world. 
A Towers Perrin study on a more complete sample concluded that the population compensation for CEOs 
hovers around 39 times that of the average worker.12  
High CEO pay is justifi ed in that it aligns CEO interest with company performance and thus 
shareholder incentives, is freely agreed upon and serves to adequately compensate for job demands and 
foregone opportunities.  Arguments involving increased competition and incentives show that high 
payments are not only justifi ed, but necessary to sustain the attraction of talented workers to CEO positions. 
Together, these ideas show that the reasoning behind high CEO compensation is legitimate and moral.  
Spring 2008 | SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, & Economics Undergraduate Journal      51
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Author Unlisted. “In Th e Money”. 18 January 2007. Th e Economist. Online. Available from Internet, 
<http://economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8513949>, Accessed 18 December 
2007. 
2. Friedman, Milton. “Th e Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profi ts”. New York Times 
Magazine, 1970. 
3. Author Unlisted. SEC Spotlight on Executive Pay: Will it Make a Diff erence? 8 February 2006. 
Knowledge at Wharton. Online. Available from Internet, < http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=1374>, Accessed 18 December 2007. 
4. Moriarty, Jeff rey. “Do CEOs Get Paid Too Much?” Business Ethics Quarterly. Volume 15: Issue 2, 2005.
5. Gabaix and Landier. 22 July 2006. “Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?” Online, Available from 
Internet. 
< http://www.princeton.edu/~bcf/Seminar06/GabaixPaper.pdf >, Accessed 18 December 2007. 
6. Moriarty, Jeff rey. “Do CEOs Get Paid Too Much?” Business Ethics Quarterly. Volume 15: Issue 2, 2005.
7. Author Unlisted. “A Payday for Performance”. 18 April 2005. BusinessWeek. Online. Available from 
Internet, 
<http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_16/b3929100_mz017.htm>, Accessed 18 
December 2007.
8. MacDonald, Elizabeth. “Pay Dirt”. 21 May 2007. Forbes. Online. Available from Internet,  
<http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2007/0521/108.html>, Accessed 18 December 2007. 
9. Ibid.
10. Author Unlisted. “Better Pay for All”. 18 January 2007. Th e Economist. Online. Available from 
Internet,
< http://economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8514056>, Accessed 18 December 
2007. 
11. “Fredrick W. Cook & Co. Testimony”. Testimony Before the House Financial Services Committee.  
Online. Available from Internet, <http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/5-25-06_FWC_Testimony_
Before_the_House_Financial_Services_Committee_on_Executive_Compensation.pdf>. Accessed 18 
December 2007. 
12. Ibid.
